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I find the first legislative reference to insanity in criminal cases
in the Statutes of Louisiana in the year 1844, when by Act No. 32,
of that year, approved February 24th, it was provided as follows:
"Whenever any person who is or may be arrested, and in custody or
in prison, to answer for any crime or crimes, offense or misdemeanor,
before any of the courts of this state having criminal jurisdiction,
shall be acquitted thereof by the jury of trials, or shall not be indicted
by the grand jury by reason of the insanity or mental derangement
of -such person, and the discharge and going at large of such person,
shall be deemed ,by the same court to be dangerous to the safety of
the citizens or to the peace of the commonwealth, the said court be
and is hereby authorized and empowered to commit such person to
the Insane Hospital of New Orleans, or any similar institution in any
parish within the jurisdiction of the court, there to be detained until
he or she be restored to his or her right mind, or otherwise delivered
by due course of law.
"Whenever the Grand Jury upon any inquiry which they may
hereafter make as to the commission of any crime or misdemeanor
by any person, shall omit to find a bill for the cause aforesaid, it
shall be the duty of such jury to certify the same to the said court.
"Whenever the jury of trials, upon the general issue of not guilty,
shall acquit any person for the cause aforesaid, it shall be the duty
of such jury, in giving in their verdict of not guilty, to state that it
was for such cause."
This law was re-enacted in 1855 (No. 121) and was carried into
the last revision of the Statutes, 1870, as Sections 993, 994 and 995,
and duplicated in 1778, 1779 and 1780, with the change, however, from
the Insane Hospital of New Orleans to the State Insane Hospital, of
which there are now two, but the criminal insane are sent to the one
at Jackson.
The jurisprudence of Louisiana, is, that when the question of
insanity of the defendant in any case is at issue, the jury are to be
told that every man is presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient
'Read before the Congress of Alienists and Neurologists, Chicago, July, 1917.
2Member of the Bar of New Orleans, La.
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.degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary
be proved to the satisfaction of the jury; and that to establish a
defense on the ground of insanity it must be clearly proved that, at
the time of committing the act, the accused was laboring under such
a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the
nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it,
that he did not know he was doing wrong.
This principle was announced in the case of State v. Scott, 49th
Louisiana Annual Reports, 253 (1897), where in the syllabus prepared
by Mr. Justice Miller, who rendered the opinion, it was said:
"The law presuming sanity, the burden is on the accused urging
his insanity as a defense to prove it.
"That proof must satisfy the jury the accused was not of sane
,mind at the time of the act charged. They should consider all the
testimony before them, whether presented by the accused or the state,
and give due weight to the presumption of sanity. If on the whole
testimony and giving to the presumption of sanity its full operation,
they are satisfied the accused was insane when the act was committed,
they should acquit; but, if not thus satisfied, they should deem the
accused sane and responsible."
And the court reversed the judgment and set aside the verdict of
the jury, remanding the case for a new trial, because the charge of
the District Judge was not what it should have been in accordance
with the reasoning of the court.
Mr. Justice Breaux, afterwards Chief Justice, and now an honored
member of the Louisiana Bar, to which he returned after serving on
the court for twenty-four years, dissented and said:
"Under the common law every man is presumed sane until the
contrary be proven.
"Insanity, as i plea, should be proved as a substantive fact by
theaccused, on whom the burden of proof rests. Being of the opin-
ion that the proof of insanity at the time of committing the act ought
to be made as clear and satisfactory by the accused to secure his
acquittal on the ground of -insanity as the proof of committingr he act
ought to be made evident by the state in order to find a sane man
guilty, I respectfully dissent."
As the burden of proof of insanity is on the defendant, it is
proper for the trial court to refuse to charge that the state must
.prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the prisoner was sane when he
committed the act and not error on the contrary to charge, that the
law presumes the sanity of every man, and that it devolves on the
prisoner, under a plea of insanity, to satisfy the jury by a preponder-
ance of proof that he was insane at the time of the commission of
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the act, with the qualification, however, given in the 'quotation from
the Scott case above referred to."
And, therefore, the Supreme Court in the case of State v. Colenta 8
held that it was proper for the District Judge to refuse to charge: "If
some controlling disease was in truth the acting power within the
prisoner which he could not resist, or if he had not a sufficient use of
his reason to control the passion which prompted the act complained
of, he is not responsible."
When the presumption of sanity and insanity come in conflict,
the latter must give way, and where all the ingredients of a crime,
save sanity, are admitted or proved, and there is-no other evidence on
the subject, the presumption of sanity is sufficient to establish or main-
tain that condition, and to rebut the presumption of innocence. The
mere plea of insanity does not affect the presumption of sanity, but
in the face of such plea, unsupported by proof, it is the duty of the
judge to instruct the jury that the law presumes the defendant to be
sane, and that they ought to be governed by the law.
As said in one case: "A plea of insanity, the last resort of im-
periled criminals, will surely noi be listened to when the defendant's
own witnesses disprove it." '
\ The case of Scott, supra, in holding that it was error to charge
that sanity must be established beyond a reasonable doubt expressly
overruled State v. Clements,5 State v. DeRance,6 and State v. Coleman,
supra, where the contrary doctrine had been announced, though the
court in the DeRance case found that the authorities and text writers
were in conflict on this point, but adopted the rule that:
"Insanity must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt," for prac-
tically the same reasons as were given in the dissenting opinion of
Justice Breaux, which I have before quoted in full.
In the Scott case, the court quoted approvingly from State v.
Coleman, supra, where it was held that the District judge did not
err in refusing to charge:- "If the jury entertained any doubt of the
prisoner's sanity they must acquit him of guilt," saying that: "The
burden of proof is upon the party setting up the defense."
Again referring to the Scott case, I quote the following from the
opinion of the court:
"It will suffice if the jury are told, in effect, that the burden of
proof is on accused to establish by clear convincing proof the insanity
827th Louisiana Annual Reports, 691 (1875).
4State v. George, 37th Louisiana Annual Reports, 786 (1885).
547th Louisiana Annual Reports, 1008 (1895).
634th Louisiana Annual Reports, 186 (1882).
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he urges as a defense; that the presumption of sanity is to be taken
into consideration, and exercise its full influence, along with all the
testimony before them, whether produced by the accused, or by the
state; and if, on the consideration of the whole testimony, giving due
weight to the presumption of sanity, they are satisfied the accused
was not of sane mind when the act charged was committed, they are
to acquit, but, if not thus satisfied, they are to hold the accused sane
and responsible."
In disapproving the charge of the judge which caused the reversal
of the sentence, the setting aside of the verdict, and the remanding of
the case, the court said:
"The charge in this case implies, if it does not express, that
though there may be a preponderance of testimony before the jury
to show that the accused was insane at the time of the act, yet they
may convict. It is not easy to convince that with this preponderat-
ing proof they can deem guilt established beyond a reasonable doubt
-the prerequisite of any conviction. Can, then, this charge be sus-
tained, which exacts punishment upon preponderating proof producing
not only a reasonable doubt of guilt, but preponderating to carry the
conclusion that no guilt can exist because of the absence of that moral
accountability, the basis of all ptinishment for crime. Between hang-
ing the maniac or bringing to the scaffold one whose insanity is estab-
lished by a preponderance of testimony, before the jury that pro-
nounces him guilty, is a difference in degree not of principle. A con-
viction, when insanity is thus proved, this charge sanctions. If we turn
to the authority of text books and decisions, it must seem diffi-
cult to maintain the charge, conceding all due weight to the decisions
of our predecessors and types of that class in some of the decisions
of the courts of other states. In State v. Spencer, 21, N. J. Law, 196,
the court instructed, if in weighing testimony of insanity against that
of sanity, the scales are balanced, or so nearly poised as to leave a
reasonable doubt of insanity, the accused was to be deemed sane. This
decision that sustains punishment when guilt is ascertained by the
balanced or nearly poised scale is in marked contrast with the rule
that exacts proof of guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. In one of
the text books there is the comment that this decision has been
departed from in the New Jersey courts."
7
Intoxication to such a degree as to render the accused incapable
of malice in the perpetration of a homicide is a special defense, like
a plea of insanity, and puts the burden of proving it upon the party
urging it, and its truth must be established by a fair preponderance
of evidence; and while the state must prove malicious intent beyond
reasonable doubt, it is not its duty to prove a negative by showing that
accused was not intoxicated to such a degree as to render him incapable
of entertaining malice at the time of the homicide beyond a reasonable
7Bishop Criminal Procedure, Section 671.
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doubt; the judge was, therefore, right in refusing to charge: "If the
-jury has a reasonable doubt whether defendant was intoxicated to
such a degree as to create a state of mental confusion, excluding the
possibility of a specific intent to take life, or positive premeditation,
then the verdict should be guilty of manslaughter.""
The rule in Louisiana is that the question of insanity may be
presented even on a motion for a new trial, but the motion must be
-supported by sufficient evidence tending to substantiate the insanity,
or it will not be considered. Where it is evident that the defendant
had will power and could control himself and manage his business,
.he was held not to be insane, although he entertained extraordinary
and unreasonable ideas on certain subjects.
State v. Lyons,9is very interesting; the defendant in that case had
murdered the District Attorney for the Parish of Orleans, was con-
victed of murder and sentenced to be hanged, and the opinion by Mr.
Justice (now Chief Justice) Monroe, with a syllabus prepared by
himself in twenty sections, occupies forty-three pages, affirming the
judgment and in due course the defendant was executed. I some-
what condense part of the opinion of the court as follows:
The judge instructed the jury that in order to convict accused,
,they must find not only that he knew the nature and quality of the
act charged, at the time of its commission, and knew it was wrong,
but'that he was mentally capable whether to commit it or not, and
- of governing his conduct by such choice, and that he should be
acquitted if they found that, though he committed such act, knowing
its nature and knowing it to be wrong, they also found that he was
impelled thereto by the irresistible impulse of a lunatic, and not the
passionate impulse of a sane man; and that insane delusion excuses
an act otherwise criminal, when the delusion was such that the person
under its influence firmly 'believed in the existence of some imagined
fact -or condition which, if existent, would have excused such act, -
-as -when the belief .vas that the party killed had an immediate design
on his life, and under that belief the insane man killed his supposed
enemy in supposed self-defense, but that if the delusion was that the
party killed had acted injuriously toward his slayer, or had com-
mitted any act which did not expose the life of the latter to imminent
-danger 6r-subject his person to great bodily harm, it would not excuse
,or justify the killing. The requested additional charge that: "If the
-jury-believe from the evidence that defendant insanely believed at
_the time of the commission of the act either that the imagined evil was
so intolerable as to make life-taking necessary or justifiable in order
to avert it, or that life-taking was an appropriate and just way of
gettint rid of'it, he is entitled to be acquitted," was properly refused,
sState v. Hill, 46th Louisiana Annual Reports, 27 (1894).
9113th Louisiana Annual Reports, 959 (1904).
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being calculated to mislead the jury. The doctrine of moral insanity,
which consists of irresistible impulse co-existent with mental sanity,
has no support either in psychology or law.
Our courts have held that: "If a person, being in possession of
his mental faculties, voluntarily gets into a fit of drunkenness, and
during such drunkenness commits a homicide under a diseased mental
condition occasioned by the same, he cannot set up such diseased
mental condition as an excuse for his act.
"In order that a man should stand excused for a homicide com-
mitted during drunkenness and while in a diseased mental condition,
the diseased mental condition which excuses the homicide should
be able to be successfully urged as an excuse for the act of getting
drunk.
"The effect of drunkenness upon the mind and upon men's actions
when under the full influence of liquor are facts known to everyone,
and it is as much the duty of men to abstain from placing themselves
in a condition from which so much danger to others is to be appre-
hended as it is for men to abstain from firing into a crowd, or doing
any other act likely to be attended with dangerous or fatal con-
sequences. It would open the door wide to the commission of crime
were we to justify the commission of a homicide committed under a
condition of mind designated as 'delirium tremens,' when it was, in
all probability nothing more or less than the condition of mind usually
resulting from a condition of thorough drunkenness. It would be
utterly impossible to distinguish between the two conditions of mind,
if in reality there be a difference between the two.
"It is, of course, as possible for an insane man to get drunk as
for a sane man. The addition of drunkenness to insanity does not
withhold from such person the protection due to insanity, but, when
such a person commits a homicide during drunkenness, reliance must
be placed upon the original insanity itself, not upon the subsequent
drunkenness."'1
"A homicide committed during a drunken debauch is not rend-
ered excusable by the fact that long-continued indulgence in drink-
ing by the party committing the killing had created in him a desire
to drink so strong that it was out of his power to resist, * * *
even though this drunkenness may be such at the time of, the commis-
sion of the homicide as to render his mind incapable of knowing right
from wrong. If the debauch be one continuing voluntary drunken
debauch, starting with the sanity of the party engaged in it, the mere
length of time the debauch may extend over is immaterial. Drunken-
ness for a week no more excuses a homicide committeed as its im-
mediate and direct result than would drunkenness for an hour.""
'
Any state of mind resulting from a state of drunkenness, unless
a permanent and' continuous result, does not excuse the commission
of the crime.
lOState v. Kraenter, 49th Louisiana Annual Reports, 766 (1897).
3"State v. Haab, 105th Louisiana Reports, 230 (1901).
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"The correct rule is * * * that it must appear, in order to
excuse the act, that the prisoner at the time of committing it was in
such a state of mental insanity, not produced by the immediate effects
of intoxicating drinks, as not to have been conscious of the moral
turpitude of the act. Under this rule, it is settled that insanity pro-
duced by delirium tremens affects the responsibility in the same way
as insanity produced by any other cause * * * In other words,
when drunkenness is the remote cause of insanity, where the latter
proceeds from causes which are themselves the effect of antecedent
excesses, the party is not responsible. The law looks to the proximate
cause of the insanity, and if that be drunkenness, it is no excuse for
crime."
Thus, the requested charge that: "If, * * * accused, at the
time of inflicting the mortal stroke, was insane, and not capable of
self-control from the use of intoxicating liquors or other poison,
administered and sold to him by the deceased, the jury should not find
him guilty," was properly refused, the court saying: "It is too broad,
and would have led the jury into the belief that the frenzy of drunken-
ness is an excuse for homicide."' 2
So, a charge: "That drunkenness does excuse crime where, in
the absence of criminal intent, the condition of accused was such that
he knew not what he was doing, and intended no offense * * * is
erroneous as an abstract proposition of law." 13
While drunkenness is not an excuse for crime, but on the con-
trary is an aggravation, yet: "Intoxication of the accused may be
invoked to negative malice or deliberate intent, in the absence of evi-
dence, aliunde, to prove premeditation. The intoxication inust be of
such a character as to create a state of mental confusion, excluding
the possibility of a specific intent to take life, or, positive premedita-
tion."
The court further held that it was entirely too liberal to accused
to charge: "That the intoxication of the accused could mitigate the
homicide to manslaughter, if such intoxication in the opinion of the
jury was of such a character as to incapacitate the accused from
forming a deliberate intent to kill the deceased, unless the evidence
would satisfy the jury that he had intoxicated himself for the pur-
pose of provoking deceased into a difficulty, and of then killing him."' 4
In State v. Wilson,15 the judgment was set aside and the case
remanded owing to improper remarks of the District Attorney, and
in the course of its opinion the Supreme Court quoted from one of
the bills of exception as follows:
"The court charged the jury that drunkenness was no excuse for
committing a crime, unless that drunkenness had been of such long.
standing as to render the party unaccountable for his acts, but refused
12State v. Watson, 31st Louisiana Annual Reports, 379 (1879).
13State v. Washingtol, 36th Louisiana Annual Reports, 341 (1884).
14State v. Trivas, 32d Louisiana Annual Reports, 1086 (1880).
15124th Louisiana Reports, 82 (1909).
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to charge 'that it was an excuse unless the party got drunk for the
purpose of committing the crime,' as I thought that too broad and
not the law," commented on same as follows:
"We think that the requested charge was not explicit enough,
in that it did not explain when it is that intoxication is a defense to
crime; or, in other words, on account of what particular feature of
the case on trial that defense was admissible.
"The judge had therefore the right to refuse it. But as the
case is to be tried again, we will take occasion to say that the judge's
charge was not quite full enough."
And in the case of State v. Hogan,6 in discussing the question of
drunkenness as producing insanity, which was pleaded in defense,
the court said:
"Where the defense was insanity, and defendant's evidence tended
to show that his alleged condition resulted from chronic drunken-
ness, and evidence on-the part of the prosecution tended to show that
the defendant had at no time been ill since his arrest, it was com-
petent for the state to prove in rebuttal by a physician that a man
suffering from such a mania could not recover within ten days with-
out medical treatment."
The rulings of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, regarding evi-
dence of insanity have generally been uniform and consistent to the
effect that: "Insanity, when pleaded in defense of a criminal act,
such as homicide, must be clearly shown to have existed at the time
of the commission of the act."'
7
In the case "of State v. Hays,' Mr. Justice Howe, one of the
ablest of the many eminent men who have sat on the bench of the
Supreme Court of Louisiana, in holding that:
"In a criminal prosecution for the crime of murder the witnesses
for the accused may, under the plea of insanity, 'be permitted to give
to the jury the acts, declarations, conversations and- exclamations they
saw, had with, and heard the accused make at any time shortly before,
at the time of, or after the killing, analyzed the subject in the follow-
ing strong and pertinent langudge:
"The defense in this case was insanity. In the solution of the
question presented by the bill of exceptions, it becomes necessary,
therefore, to inquire what scope is allowed to the prisoner in establish-
ing such a defense by the enlightened spirit of modem jurisprudence.
"Insanity is a disease. It has its pathology and its symptoms,
and it would seem that its existence can be determined only by a
careful scrutiny of those symptoms. The tree is to be known by its
fruits; the condition of the hidden mechanism is to be ascertained by
those communicated movements which are external and apparent. To
this end the usual expressions of a mental state are original and
16117th Louisiana Reports, 863 (1906).
17State v. Graviotte, 22d Louisiana Annual Reports, 587 (1870).
'122d Louisiana Annual Reports, 39 (1870).
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competent evidence. If they are the natural language of mental
alienation, they furnish satisfactory, and sometimes the only proof
of its existence. It is true, that such expressions may be feigned and
often are; but whether they were real or feigned is for the jury to
determine. Hence, the rule prevails that as indicia of the mental
condition, not only the acts, but the conversations, exclamations and
declarations of the person may be shown. Of course, this rule should
not -be extended beyond the necessity on which it is founded-mere
narrative or statement by the accused, as that at a certain time he said
or did something, or at a certain time he was insane must 'be excluded;
but testimony of such deportment, action, complaints, exclamations,
declarations and expressions, as usually and naturally accompany and
furnish proof of an existing malady, ought to be freely admitted.
"We think it equally well settled that all such indicia occurring
after the commission of the offense, may be shown, and that the judge,
therefore, erred in confirming the testimony to acts done before the
homicide. It is true, that mania is often simulated, and it-is quite
likely that the danger of simulating may increase after the commis-
sion of a homicide; but this consideration relates rather to the effect
of the testimony than to its admissibility. It may have little weight;
but such as it has the jury must estimate. Previous or subsequent
insanity in itself is no matter of -excuse; the mania must have existed
at the time the act was done; yet evidence of the presence of the mal-
ady, either before or after the act is proper to be weighed by the jury,
for the purpose of forming a conclusion whether insanity existed
at the time the alleged crime was committed. And this evidence, we.
apprehend, may be identical in character with that which is admitted
to establish mental unsoundness prior tothe act."
The judgment sentencing -the defendant and the verdict of the
jury were accordingly set aside and the case remanded for a new
trial. 
I
Judge Howe, who before coming to Louisiana, had been a member
of the Bar of New York, reinforced his conclusions with citations of
authorities from the courts of many' states other than Louisiana.
,jn-State v. McIntosh,19 the Hays case was quoted by the court
in silpport of the following propositions:
"It is as important that a person should not be required to plead
to an indictment for crime or be tried for his life or liberty while he
is insane as it is that he be not held responsible for the acts he com-
mitted while insane...
"The question of sanity or insanity of the accused at the time
of the alleged crime must be decided by the jury along with all-other
questions pertaining to his guilt or innocence, but a plea of present
insanity challenges the right of the state to proceed with the prosecu-
tion, and, if filed before the trial by jury has commenced, it ought
29136th Louisiana Reports, 1000 (1915).
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to be heard and decided by the judge before allowing the prosecution
to go on.
"Defendant's plea being insanity, the court properly refused to
charge that the prisoner is entitled to an acquittal if on all the evi-
dence there is a reasonable doubt of his sanity at the time of the com-
mission of the act, and properly charged, instead, that the defendant
has to prove his insanity by a fair preponderance of evidence."20
While our courts are liberal in admitting testimony in favor of
an accused on his plea of insanity, the evidence must be presented with
due diligence and technicalities will not avail him in this regard.
For instance, in the case of State v. Manceaux,2 1 the court
through Chief justice Bermudez said:
"It is not enough for an accused who moves for a continuance
on the ground of the absence of a material witness duly subpoenaed
to swear that he was afflicted before the occurrence with a disease
which left as a trace a temporary aberration of mind, rendering him
irresponsible.
"Necessarily, he must have had lucid intervals, .since the aberra-
tion was temporary.
"He should have set forth the fact that at the time of the com-
mission of the act he was insane and irresponsible, exclusively to the
knowledge of the absent and wanted witness."
What was said by the Supreme Court in the case of Eloi v. Eloi,2
which was a civil suit to have the defendant declared insane, has been
often referred to in criminal cases and states the law clearly and con-
cisely:
"The opinions of witnesses, who are not physicians or experts
in matters of insanity, touching the condition of the mind of a human
being, are entitled to little or no weight as evidence in a trial involv-
ing the alleged insanity of a person.
"Such witnesses should state facts and incidents in the life and
conduct of the party, from which the court alone is authorized to
draw inferences and legal deductions touching the true condition of
the mind of the person on trial for interdiction. (Interdiction is the
Louisiana term for lunacy proceedings).
"Great weight and legal effect will be given to the opinion and
report of physicians and experts appointed to inquire into the condition
of the Darty.
"Where non-expert opinion testimony as to insanity has been
received on the stand, evidence tending to show the expression of an




Stete v. Jihnston. 118th Louisiana Renorts, 276 (1907).
2142d I ouisiana Annual Reports, 1164 (1890).
2236th Louisiana Annual Reports, 563 (1884).
23Hogan case, supra.
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"Testimony given by the accused in his own behalf that at the
time he had made certain statements 'he was drunk or under the in-
fluence of dope' can be disproved by the testimony of 'non-expert'
witnesses.
24
"The trial court has much discretion in the matter of permitting
hypothetical questions to be propounded to an expert witness for the
purpose of eliciting from him his opinion as to the sanity of the accused
at the time when the homicide with which he was charged was com-
mitted; this discretion covering both the form and the substance of
the question."
"When the hypothetical question which counsel for the defendant
proposes to submit to the expert as a premise on which to express an
opinion as to the sanity of the accused includes matters as to which
there has been as yet no testimony before the jury, and as to which he
simply declares he expects to produce testimony, he should at least
make the offer conditioned upon an obligatioh upon his part to sub-
sequently offer such testimony. When the trial court has refused to
allow the question to be asked on the ground that the premises on
which the question is based is as to matters not supported by testimony
as yet before the jury, the accused complaining of the rulings should
be able to show by the record that such testimony was in fact sub-
sequently placed before the jury."2
In the case of State v. Smith,28 the court said:
"While we are far from holding that imbecility and insanity can
be established only by expert testimony, we are of the opinion that it
is within the province of the trial judge to determine whether witnesses
offered as experts, as he says that the witnesses in question were
offered, are to be heard in that capacity. Before a witness can be
permitted to testify as an expert, his fitness and character as such
should be established by a preliminary examination; and in ascertain-
ing his competency the court may examine the witness himself, or
may find the fact from the testimony of others. This fitness of a
witness to testify as an expert is a question of fact, and it is addressed
in every instance to and lies within the sound discretion of the trial
court. A non-expert witness who had adequate means of becoming
acquainted with the mental state of a person whose sanity is in issue,
may, no doubt, give his opinion, based upon facts to be stated by
him, as to whether such person was insane at the time of a specific
occurrence. And we think that such an opinion would be admissible,
subject to the limitation mentioned, upon the question whether the
person inquired about had beefi insane, or had been an imbecile
throughout his life. But without the limitation, it would-not be ad-
missible * * *. And as, in the case at bar, it does not appear that
anything more was to be elicited from the witnesses than their opin-
ions, which the judge states in his return was the sole purpose for
24State v. Ryan, 122d Louisiana Annual Reports. 1095 (1909).
25State v. Ayles, 120th Louisiana Reports, 661 (1908).
26106th Louisiana Reports, 33 (1901).
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which their testimony was offered, upon the case as thus presented,
we find no sufficient reason for disturbing the judgment appealed
from."
To the same effect was State v. Montgomery :27
"The testimony of non-expert witnesses regarding sanity may,
under proper safeguards and under certain state of facts, be admitted."
But in State v. Heidelberg,28 the court concluded to be not too
liberal by saying:
"The hearsay opinion of even an expert on insanity is not ad-
missible in evidence."
it State v. Charles,29 the court laid down certain rules where
insanity was a defense in this language:
"Where a plea of present insanity is made on behalf of the
accused, the judge may appoint a commission of experts to inquire
into the mental condition of the defendant, or may refer the issue to
a jury.
"The insanity of a person whose mental condition is at issue can-
not be 1iroved by reputation in the family or by general reputation."
"A general objection to a charge on the subject of insanity, accom-
panied by no request for special instruction, will not avail."
In the case-of State v. Richmond2  where the defendant was
charged with murdering her new born babe, the court said:
"The accused offered a physician as an expert witness, by whom
to prove that puerperal mania, or insanity, was a common disease
after childbirth, and often took on the form of homicidal mania, and
the trial judge disallowed the testimony, because no proper foundation
had been laid for its introduction. In support of his ruling, he states
that, while it was in proof that the accused occasionally had spasms,
they were notshown to have occurred at the time of the birth of the
child, nor to have been referrable in it. That, outside of the state-
ment of the accused, there was no satisfactory proof that she was
alone and unassisted at the birth of her child. We cannot perceive
any analogy between the evidence introduced and that which was
offered and refused. In the absence of all proof tending to show any
derangement of the mind of the accused at the time she gave birth
to the child, or, indeed, even tending to show what was her condition
at the time, or that she was alone and unattended, expert testimony,
like the one in question, could serve no valuable purpose and was in-
applicable and inadmissible, and properly rejected. It was irrevelant."
In the case of State v. Paine,8 1 it was held:
"The trial judge having selected and appointed competent phys-
27121st Louisiana Reports, 1005 (1908).28120th Louisiana Reports, 300 (1908).
29124th Louisiana Reports, 744 (1909).
3042d Louisiana Annual Reports, 299 (1890).
3149th Louisiana Annual Reports, 1092 (1897).
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icians as experts to make an examination of the mental condition of
the defendant, with the object in view that they, as witnesses, should
be better prepared to intelligently state his situation to the jury at the
trial, it was not a condition precedent to the trial being proceeded with
that the physicians should make a written and detailed report of such
an examination to the court."
And in State v. Douglas,32 the Supreme Court upheld the action
of the District Court in refusing the motion of the defendant for the
appointment of a board of experts to examine into his sanity for
the reason that the very physicians named in the order had at the
request of the defendant's counsel, examined him and pronounced
him sane, and that their testimony as witnesses could not in the least
prejudice the defendant, though they were not formally named as
experts.
In Louisiana, the Supreme Court on appeal in criminal cases has
no jurisdiction over the facts and cannot inquire into the question as
to whether or not the defendant was insane, and it is a question solely
for the jury; and therefore, the quotations above made have reference
only to issues of law presented to the Supreme Court, by proper bills
of exceptions during the progress of the trial.
"A person indicted for crime cannot, validly, plead, or be tried,
or convicted, or sentenced, while in a state of insanity, although his
mental derangement may have only supervened since the date of the
crime charged.
"The objection of present insanity may be made at any stage of
the proceedings. It requires no special or formal plea, but may be
adequately presented orally, or the court may itself suggest and act
upon its own observations.
"Whenever and however presented, evidence, if offered, must be
received, and the issue must, in some way, be determined.
"As to the mode of determining it, some discretion is left to the
judge, according to the time and circumstances under which the ob-
jection is made.
"When raised during the progress of the trial, the better course
seems to be to submit the special issue, with the general issue, to the
jury; but whatever be the judge's discretion on this point it is error
to refuse to entertain the objection, or to receive evidence, or to
determine it in any way."33
Subsequent to the conviction of Lyons and the finality of the
judgment of the Supreme Court heretofore referred to, his counsel
32116th Louisiana Reports, 524 (1906).
33State v. Reed, 41st Louisiana Annual Reports, 581 (1889).
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applied to the trial court alleging the defendant was then insane, asking
for the appointment of a commission to examine into his sanity; but the
District Judge refused the motion and also refused an appeal, which
action the Supreme Court sustained saying:
"It is obvious that to permit convicts to arrest the execution of
sentence imposed on them by demanding, as a matter of legal right,
the appointment of medical experts to examine into their mental con-
dition, would 'be tantamont to granting them the privilege of thwarting
the administration of criminal justice for an indefinite time."3 "
So where, before verdict, insanity was not urged, but after con-
viction, at the instance of accused, a commission of medical experts is
appointed to examine and report upon his mental condition, a majority
of whom report him of sound mind, and thereafter he makes applica-
tion for trial by jury of the issue of insanity vel non, the judge may
refuse such application, there being no law which imposes on him the
ministerial duty of directing a trial of such an issue by a jury. "In
such case the allowance of trial by jury must be governed and con-
trolled by the circumstances surrounding, and the situation of the
case."
35
J. Benjamin Chandler was quite a character in the City of New
Orleans, for many years; he was a veteran both of the Mexican war
and of the war between the states, serving in the latter throughout the
Confederate army. On October 7, 1848, he killed a man by the name
of Patrick C. Daley, and was indicted for murder, the trial judge giving
this remarkable charge to the jury:
"I have rarely known a case in which the crime of murder was
more clearly brought home to the prisoner, and I cannot think you
can entertain any reasonable doubt of his guilt."
The jury, however, did not agree with the judge, because the;
found the defendant guilty only of manslaughfer; he pleaded self-
defense and the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for
want of a proper charge as asked for by the defendant as well as for
the improper charge above quoted.3 6
In 1892, Chandler was indicted for libel; he had been executor for
an estate where I was his attorney, but I withdrew from the case when
he filed in the Supreme Court what he called a brief on application for
rehearing, it being an attack upon the court, the witnesses and opposite
counsel. The particular libel for which he was indicted was against one
34Lyons v. Judge, 114th Louisiana Reports, 81 (1905).
35Arimstrong v. Judge, 48th Louisiana Annual Reports, 503 (1896).
36State v. Chandler, 5th Louisiana Annual Reports, 489 (1850).
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of the judges of the District Court whom he alleged had entered into
a conspiracy to injure him and deprive some of the heirs to the estate
of their rights; he also brought a suit against this judge, and there-
upofi all the judges, five in number, recused themselves and called 4tpon
Mr. E. B. Kruttschnitt, then an eminent member of the New Orleans
Bar, to try the case, which resulted in the dismissal thereof. In the
libel case the defendant did not set up insanity, but the court on the
suggestion of the District Attorney, subsequent to the verdict and
prior to the sentence, doubts having arisen in his mind as to the sanity
of Chandler, thereupon appointed experts and referred the matter to
another jury; the Supreme Court held this proceeding proper against
the protest of Chandler, who did not want to -be considered insane,
but during the trial thereof, the Supreme Court held that the defend-
ant should be released on a nominal bond instead of one for ten thou-
sand dollars, exacted by the court. The final result was a most peculiar
verdict: "Not gtuilty, on the grounds of insanity." My recollection is
that the defendant died soon after, but whether in prison, or in an
insane asylum, or elsewhere, I do not recall.3"
In the case of State v. Oteri,38 the court was called upon to con-
strue Acts Nos. 105 of the Legislative Session of Louisiana of 1896,
and 264 of 1910, respectively, reading as follows:
"Whenever any convict serving a sentence in the penitentiary
shall become insane, it shall be the duty of the warden of the peni-
tentiary together with the clerk of the Board of Control to pres-
ent a petition to the District Court, where the penitentiary is located,
setting forth the insanity of such convict and praying for his inter-
diction and removal to the asylum for the insane.
"Where a person has been committed to the hospital for the insane,
who becomes insane after his conviction for a crime punishable by
imprisonment in the penitentiary or by death, he shall not upon regain-
ing his sanity be restored to liberty."
But the court went no further than to say that the law of 1910:
"Evidently contemplates- that there is some mode by which in the
interval between sentence and execution the sanity of a convict may
be pronounced; and, in the nature of things, the only court having
jurisdiction is that having jurisdiction of the place prescribed by law
for the detention of the convict.
"The jurisdiction of the court that tried and sentenced the con-
vict necessarily ceases when the convict by operation of law passes
out of its control and under that of the officers of the penitentiary."
With this very imperfect discussion of so important a question
37Chandler applying for writs of habeas corpus, etc., 45th Louisiana Annual
Reports, 696 (1893).
38129th Louisiana Reports, 921 (1912).
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as I have endeavored feebly to present, I will close with reference
to a rather curious case.
In 1855, there was before the Supreme Court the case of State v.
Patten," in which appeared the following remarkable proceedings in
the District Court:
"On the 20th day of March, 1854, after the evidence on the part
of the state was closed, and when the counsel of the prisoner were
proceeding to prove, by the evidence of the witness, the insanity of
the said prisoner at the time of the killing, set forth in the indictment,
and a long time before, and even since the said killing, the said prisoner
arose and objected to, and repudiated the said defense, and insisted
upon discharging his counsel and submitting his case to the jury with-
out any further evidence or action of his counsel in his defense; his
counsel opposed and remonstrated against the prisoner being permitted
to do so, alleging that they were prepared to prove the defense by
clear and irresistible testimony, but the court overruled the objection
of the said counsel and permitted the prisoner to discharge his counsel,
and refused to hear them further in his defense, and gave the case
to the jury without any further evidence or pleading on his behalf
* * *. There was a verdict of 'guilty, without capital punishment,'
and after his former counsel had, in the quality of amici cieiae,,
attempted to obtain a new trial and an arrest of judgment without
success, the prisoner was sentenced to hard labor for life in the
penitentiary."
And considering the foregoing which was before the court by
bill of exceptions and appeared on the face of the record, the Supreme
Court said:
"The sanity or insanity of the prisoner is a matter of fact; the
admissibility of evidence to establish his insanity, under the, cir-
cumstances detailed in the bill of exceptions, is a matter of law, and
the only matter which the constitution authorizes this tribunal to
decide.
"The case is so extraordinary in its circumstances, that we are
left without the aid of precedents.
"In support of the ruling of the district judge, it has been urged
that as every man is presumed to be sane until the contrary appears,
and that a person on trial for an alleged offense has a constitutional
right to discharge his counsel at any moment, to repudiate their action
on the spot, and to be heard by himself ; hence, the inference is deduced
that the judge could not have admitted the evidence against the protest
of the prisoner without reversing the ordinary presumption, and pre-
suming insanity.
"In criminal trials, it is important to keep ever in mind the dis-
tinction between law and fact, between the functions of a judge and
those of a jury.
"It was for the jury and the jury alone to determine whether
3910th Louisiana Annual Reports, 299.
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there was insanity or not, after hearing the evidence and the instruc-
tions of the court as to the principles of law applicable to the case.
"By receiving the proffered evidence for what it might be worth,
the judge should decide no question or fact; he would merely have
told the jury: 'The law permits you to hear and weigh this evidence;
whether it proves anything, it is for you to say.'
"By rejecting it, he deprived the jury of some of the means of
arriving at an enlightened conclusion upon a vital point peculiarily
within their province, and in effect, decided himself, and without the
aid of all the evidence within his reach, that the prisoner was sane
* * * If the prisoner was insane at the time of the trial, as
counsel offered to prove, he was incompetent to conduct his own
defense unaided, to discharge his counsel, or to waive a right * * *
Considering, therefore, that it would be more in accordance with the
sound legal principles and with the humane spirit which pervades the
criminal law, to allow the rejected testimony to go before the jury,
the cause must be remanded for that purpose,"
The case went back to the trial court where the verdict again
was: "Guilty, without capital punishment."
And on appeal to the Supreme Court, where the defendant was
represented by one of the counsel who appeared in the first trial, this
judgment was affirmed.40
The court said: "There are but two bills of exceptions, and
neither of them appear to have been well taken.
"The prisoner pleaded not guilty to an indictment for murder.
Upon the issue thus joined, the jury had power to find the prisoner
guilty of manslaughter. It was, therefore, pertinent and right for
the judge to instruct the jury in the law, both of murder *and man-
slaughter, notwithstanding the defendant's counsel chose to assert that
the only issue for the jury to try was the insanity of the accused.
"Nor was there error in refusing to allow the tardy moti6n for
an inquisition of lunacy, it appearing that there was no pretense that
the prisoner had 'become insane since the trial, and the question of
his sanity at the time having been fully considered and passed upon
by the jury as a question of fact. The verdict of the jury is con-
clusive upon us as to all matters of fact embraced by it."
The defendant was sentenced to hard labor in the penitentiary
for life.
4012th Louisiana Annual Reports, 288 (1857).
